Contract theory has continuously changed through time since developments are being implemented. Learning how contracts should be designed and implemented is important since both individuals and organizations need to be assured equally.
This Advanced Contract Theory will introduce you to recent updates in contract theory and it is applicable to the present moral hazard, adverse selection and mechanism designs. You are taught how incomplete contract with applications of the theory of the firm are related.
This course does not involve any written exams. Students need to answer 5 assignment questions to complete the course, the answers will be in the form of written work in pdf or word. Students can write the answers in their own time. Each answer need to be 200 words (1 Page). Once the answers are submitted, the tutor will check and assess the work.
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Course Credit: MIT
|lec1 Bayesian-Nash games||00:25:00|
|Auctions and Mechanism Design|
|lec2 Auctions 1 Common auctions, revenue equivalence, and optimal mechanisms||01:00:00|
|lec3 Auctions 2 Independent private values (IPV) and revenue equivalence||00:50:00|
|lec4 Auctions 3 Interdependent values and linkage principle||00:45:00|
|lec5 Auctions 4 Multiunit auctions and Cremer-McLean mechanism||00:35:00|
|Games with Incomplete Information|
|lec6 Simple models Hidden information, Spence’s model, and hidden action||01:10:00|
|lec7 Moral hazard Multiple agents||00:50:00|
|lec8 Dynamic adverse selection DG monopoly with fixed types||00:20:00|
|lec9 Dynamic moral hazard||00:15:00|
|lec10 Surplus division, fair distribution, the Shapley value, and Nash bargaining solution||00:50:00|
|Submit Your Assignment||00:00:00|
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